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Looking back over three and a half Assessment Reports, we see that the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) has given increasing attention to the management and reporting of 
uncertainties, but coordination across working groups (WGs) has remained an issue. We argue that 
there are good reasons for working groups to use different methods to assess uncertainty, thus it is 
better that working groups agree to disagree rather than seek to bring everybody on one party line.
In the IPCC First and Second Assessment Reports, uncertainty was not addressed systematically across 
WGs. Uncertainty statements were not centrally coordinated, but left at the  authors' discretion. In 
1990, the WG I executive summary started with what the authors were certain of and what they were 
confident about, thus taking a subjective perspective. They used strong words like “predict”, a term 
which would nowadays rightly be avoided. For WG II (Impacts) and WG III (Response Strategies), the 
review procedures were not very rigorous yet and uncertainties were not a major topic of debate. The 
formulation of key findings did take uncertainties into account, albeit not in any consistent manner. Two 
pages were devoted to scenarios – as a description of uncertainty about the future – used in the WG III 
report. The Summary for Policymakers contains a few sentences stressing several uncertainties, e.g. 
those related to the difficulty of making regional estimates of climate-change impacts.
In the Second Assessment Report (1996), WG I dropped the usage of uncertainty terms in its main 
policy messages, but added a special section on uncertainties. Efforts were made to reach consensus on 
appropriate formulations for uncertainty-laden statements. The key formulation “The balance of 
evidence suggests...” was coined during the Plenary meeting jointly by IPCC delegates and lead 
authors. “Predicting” was replaced by “projecting” climatic changes on the basis of a set of scenarios. In 
its concluding chapter "Advancing the understanding", WG I mentions the need for a more formal and 
consistent approach to uncertainties in the future. WG II, which covered scientific-technical analyses of 
impacts, adaptations and mitigation of climate change, assigned low, medium or high levels of 
confidence to the major findings of the chapters in the executive summaries, following again the 
subjective approach. Explicit reporting of uncertainties was not a key focus in the WG III assessment on 
the economic and social dimensions of climate change. They were captured through reporting of ranges 
from the literature and scenario-based what-if analyses of costs of response action. 
In preparation for the TAR (2001), a strong demand for a more systematic approach to uncertainties 
was identified - as recommended by WG I in the Second Assessment Report. The subsequent discussion 
led to the cross-cutting “Guidance Paper” by Moss and Schneider (2000). The paper summarized the 
relevant literature and build upon the Second Assessment Report's lessons. It was tempting to organize 
guidelines on uncertainty around a general scale going from totally true and certain (i.e. known) to 
totally unknowable. This indeed may be an attractive idea from the perspective of a perceived need for 
simplicity, and it has been discussed by the team which prepared the Guidance Notes. But this would 
have been oversimplification, so a two-dimensional qualitative way to qualify key findings based on the 
amount of evidence (number of sources of information) and the degree of agreement (do they point out 
in the same direction) was proposed. It was left up to author teams to calibrate the 'amount of 
evidence' and 'degree of agreement' scales. The relationship between evidence and belief varies a lot 
between disciplines. Presumably, a single available case study would score low on the first dimension, 
while more than six independent controlled experiments make a high score, on both dimensions if their 
results would be similar. Thus, the guidance paper proposed 1/ an analysis methodology (recommended 
steps for assessing uncertainty); 2/ a common vocabulary to express quantitative levels of confidence 
and 3/ terms describing qualitative levels of understanding, based on both the available amount of 
evidence and the degree of consensus among experts. 
In the Guidance Paper, no difference was made between disciplines or WGs, implicitly suggesting a 
common approach for all WGs, issues and disciplines. During the writing process, discussions in author 
teams focused on the choice of the most appropriate terminology for the summaries rather than on a 
consistent application of the full uncertainty assessment methodology. WG II largely adopted the 
proposed levels of confidence. WG I authors amended the guidelines by adding a “virtually certain” 
category and developing a different terminology for describing quantified levels of likelihood. Their 
definition of likelihoods refers to judgmental estimates of confidence. WG III authors were encouraged 
to use the Guidance Paper, but – with a few exceptions – ignored it, feeling that the proposed approach 
did not address their perspectives on uncertainty. This led to fairly consistent treatment of uncertainties 
within but not across WGs in the TAR. WG I focused on uncertainties in climatic processes and 
probabilities, WG II on risks and confidence levels, and WG III (primarily economists and other social 
scientists) continued to address uncertainties less systematically and in a different fashion. 
This outcome can be understood because the issues met with by social scientists have a different nature 
from those met with by natural scientists, adding uncertainties due to human choice to the lack of 
scientific understanding of the systems which determine climatic changes and associated impacts. More 
than a century of philosophical discussion on uncertainty has shown that there are divisions that must 
be respected: 
• The division between the objective and subjective views of probability is the oldest. Objective 
views of probability include the classical approach (probability is the proportion of favorable 
cases over total cases), the frequentist approach (probability is the limit of frequency in the long 
run (von Mises, 1957)), and the propensity approach (probability is a physical tendency (Popper, 
1959)). These views are objective in that probability is seen as an intrinsic property of the 
system. These approaches are opposed to the subjective point of view (called Bayesian by some 
authors, although there are objective Bayesians), in which probability refer to degrees of belief 
(de Finetti, 1937; Savage, 1954). 
• The distinction between risk and uncertainty is also very old (Knight, 1921). It describes the 
difference between situations where information can legitimately be represented using precise 
probabilities (risk), and situations where information is too imprecise to meaningfully use a 
probability distribution (uncertainty). In addition to risk and uncertainty, Wynne (1992) 
distinguishes ignorance (where we ‘don’t know what we don’t know’, i.e. there is no list of 
mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive list of outcomes) and – spanning uncertainty and 
ignorance – indeterminacy (where causal chains or networks are open). The later two aspects 
are either implicitly or explicitly (e.g. when describing surprises) included in IPCC assessments. 
• The third dimension is the difference between uncertainty in natural systems and uncertainty in 
human and social systems. The former are causal: the past determines the future. However, 
human systems are intentional, so the arrow of time can be reversed: long term goals can 
determine the present. Intentionality also implies that Laplace’s principle of indifference (all 
outcomes are equally probable) should be replaced with a principle of optimization: to assume 
that agents in the system will choose what they think is best rather than act randomly. Thus, 
game theory is more relevant than probability theory for analyzing these systems. 
The objective/subjective difference is philosophically irreducible, since truth and belief are 
fundamentally different concepts (and knowledge is another, requiring true belief). But the distinction 
between theories of precise risk and imprecise uncertainty is not irreducible, since precise probabilities 
can be seen as the limit case of imprecise probabilities, when the imprecision is zero. While probabilistic 
reasoning is by far the best understood method in agreement with the dominant precise approach in 
science, it is only an ideal model. Situations where precise probabilities are not well defined cannot be 
avoided when assessing the long-term future of a real global system. Mathematical procedures dealing 
with imprecision are being developed in a growing body of empirical and theoretical literature, some 
directly related to the climate change issue (see Kriegler et al., 2005). 
As for the role of human choice captured by the causal/intentionality dimension above, it is fundamental 
from a policy point of view to distinguish between the uncertainties related to a lack of knowledge about 
the way bio-geochemical and socio-economic systems function and those related to the understanding 
of the role of human choice. Allen et al. (2004) recommend that WG I distinguish between scenario 
uncertainty (different emissions paths), natural variability, and response uncertainty (incomplete 
knowledge of timescales and feedback processes). In an overview of inputs into a US hearing on 
scientific uncertainties communication, Briscoe (2004) noted that the science of climate change is 
affected by two main types of uncertainty: uncertainty about how the climate system works and 
uncertainty about how human actions will impact climate change. 
Critically for an interdisciplinary panel, there is a deep cultural divide between traditional experimental 
sciences methods and social sciences methods. Experimental sciences seek to determine precise 
objective frequencies based on a large body of observations, assuming that experiments are 
reproducible. Social sciences have rarely replicated controlled experiments or even complete 
observations, and often the most adequate available description of knowledge is narrative. This leads to 
imprecise theories, which are also subjective in that they are based on the actions of humans as 
observed by other humans.  Some debates on uncertainty within IPCC circles (for example on the 
question of the likelihood of future emission levels and resulting climate change, which depends 
critically on the socio-economic scenario) can be viewed as discussions between the imprecise-
subjective and the precise-objective positions. These cultural habits lead to a natural inclination to play 
on the difference between natural system uncertainty and human choice and to divide the various WGs 
according to the dominant epistemic philosophical position and corresponding level of precision. In AR4 
also, each WG tends to define its preferred approach regarding communication of uncertainties. 
While these differences across WGs may be confusing to readers, they are in fact both legitimate and 
appropriate. A one-size-fits-all approach would obscure important differences in the type of 
uncertainties and in the methods. The questions which are addressed by the three WGs differ, and 
hence also the approach towards uncertainty should differ. An important reason why WG III resists 
collapsing all uncertainties into a single metric is that doing misleadingly oversimplify the decision-
making issue. When likelihood estimates are available, expected net  benefit maximisation 
unambiguously defines an optimal policy, downplaying the critical issues of precaution and 
controversies. 
But agreeing to disagree on the preferred approach does not mean that the approaches are exclusive. 
Importantly, both objective and subjective sources of information can be precise or imprecise. 
Imprecision occurs in the objective frequentist setting when the sample size is small, and in the 
subjective setting when experts are deeply uncertain and cannot give precise probabilities, and hence 
cannot quantify risk. The distinction between experimental sciences and social sciences methods has 
never been a hard rule. In economics, a social science, there is a large experimental branch. And 
experimental results can also be very imprecise when there are missing data or a small number of 
observations. Even in the natural science of climate, which is largely an observational science, 
imprecision reign, since some critical data are scarce and experimentation with the climate system is 
impossible. On the other hand, there are social objects such as financial markets, which lend 
themselves well to an objective (frequentist) approach. 
From third to fourth assessment report, changes to the Guidance Notes were made to better address 
the epistemic challenges of interdisciplinarity. In the TAR guidelines (Moss and Schneider, 2000), the 
simple typology of uncertainty  listed basic 'sources' of uncertainty in the way one would list the 
possible causes of failure of a modeling process. The implicit mental model was that there is a Truth to 
be discovered, and uncertainty is the objective product of defective or limited means of knowledge. The 
corresponding typology in AR4 guidelines demonstrates a broader view on the issue of uncertainty, as it 
relates also to subjective types of uncertainty, the human dimensions of uncertainty getting a bigger 
role as a cause for unpredictability. Guidance Notes for AR4 offer both a vocabulary for levels of 
confidence (based on expert judgement) and degrees of likelihood (based on quantitative or expert 
views), as well as an expanded two dimensional table to qualitatively define levels of understanding 
using the "amount of evidence" and "level of agreement" dimensions. 
Since the guidelines' primary goal is to encourage very diverse authors to describe uncertainties, they 
can not prescribe one single approach, as a normative vocabulary that has meaning only for one 
philosophical position will not be used by everybody. The diverse, multi-dimensional approach to 
uncertainty communication used by IPCC authors teams is not only legitimate, but enhances the quality 
of the assessment by providing information about the nature of the uncertainties. In the future, authors 
should be encouraged to use the technically correct vocabulary to represent the evidence assessed in 
the literature. It is indeed desirable that WG III authors use the terminology for frequency-based 
likelihoods when data are available, even if the WG III as a group uses qualitative uncertainty 
statements. We would also promote emphasis on the distinction between findings based on 
observations, those based on models (such as the attribution of observed changes in ecosystem to 
climate change) and those based on future scenarios including human choice. Qualitative terminology is 
more adequate rather than a quantitative likelihood scale for issues that involve complex modeling 
and/or human choice, such as scenarios or the costs and potentials of response options. 
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